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EPICTETUS AND MORAL APPREHENSIVE 
IMPRESSIONS IN STOICISM 
Pavle Stojanovic 
The only person who possesses knowledge and virtue, and whose every 
action is always morally right, is the Sage, the ideal person used by the Stoics 
as a paradigm in arguing for the possibility of achieving epistemic and moral 
perfection.1 The foundation for the Sage's epistemic perfection was the so-called 
"apprehensive impression" (phantasia kataleptike), the only type of impression 
whose propositional content is such that it could not turn out false and which, 
because of this, unmistakably represents the thing that caused the impression .2 
Our sources have preserved relatively elaborate accounts of how the Stoics 
thought apprehensive impressions could lead to knowledge about nonmoral 
situations. However, our sources are less explicit about the following two 
questions. First, did the Stoics think that there are moral apprehensive 
impressions? Second, if they did, then are there any similarities and differences 
between them and nonmoral apprehensive impressions? Finally, how is the 
moral apprehensive impression supposed to contribute to the moral and practical 
perfection of the Sage? In this essay, I will argue that there is textual evidence 
in Epictetus that suggests that the answer to the first question is positive. In 
answer to the second question, I will try to offer a possible reconstruction of 
how Epictetus and his Stoic predecessors might have understood moral 
apprehensive impressions and their relationship to nonmoral apprehensive 
impressions. Finally, I will attempt to explain how moral apprehensive 
impressions might provide a foundation for morally perfect action.  
I. 
The core elements of the Stoic account of the apprehensive impression 
have been preserved by our sources at some length. According to one of the 
most common formulations of the Stoic definition reported by Sextus, the 
apprehensive impression : 
is the one that is from something existent [apo huparchon] 
and is stamped and impressed in accordance with that 
Cf. Sextus Empiricus (SE) M 7. 1 5 1 - 1 52  = LS 4 1 C 1 -5; Anon. Here. pap. 1 020 = 
LS 4!03; Stob. 2 . 1 1 1 , 1 8- 1 1 2,8 = LS 4 1 G  = IG 1 02 . 1 1 m; 2.99,3-8 = LS 59N = IG 
1 02 . 1 1 g; 2.66, 1 4-67,4 = LS 6 1 G  = IG 1 02.5b 10 .  (Bibliographic information for all 
references can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of this essay.) 
2 DL 7.46 = LS 40C; SE M 7.247-252 = LS 40E. 
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existent thing itself, and is of such a kind as could not come 
about from something that was not existent.3 
Unfortunately, interpreting in detail each of the requirements 
formulated in the definition and how exactly the Stoics thought they should 
work together is a complex question, and one that is hotly debated among 
contemporary scholars.4 Attempting to offer carefully argued solutions to these 
controversies would take us well beyond the scope of our present discussion, 
which is why a few brief remarks will have to suffice. We can say with some 
confidence that preserved accounts of the apprehensive impression yield 
something like the following account. Unlike the so-called "empty attraction" 
(diakenos elkusrnos), an impression produced by some "effects in us", i.e. by our 
minds, 5  the apprehensive impression has to be caused by something huparchon, 
i.e. by something existent. In the context of their theory of phantasia kataleptike, 6 
3 SE M 7.248 = LS 40E3. 
4 See, for example, Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions"; 
Frede, "Stoic Epistemology"; Annas, "Stoic Epistemology"; Hankinson, "Stoic 
Epistemology"; Sedley, "Zeno's Definition of phantasia kataleptike': 
S SE M 7.24 1 .  
6 The word huparchon and its verbal form huparchein were Stoic technical terms. 
As Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism': 89, has correctly noticed, the 
Stoics used them in more than one sense. Several d ifferent translations of the 
terms huparchon and huparchein have been offered, and I am not sure that there 
is one single word in English that can be used consistently to translate these 
terms in all contexts where they occur. In the context of the Stoic definition of 
the apprehensive impression, I have opted for translating huparchon as "existent" 
because in English we have at our disposal the verb "to exist" that can correspond 
to the Greek verb huparchein, and because the contrast that the Stoics made 
between the verbs huparchein and huphistasthai can conveniently be reflected in 
English by the contrast between the verbs "to exist" and "to subsist". Regarding 
the interpretation of huparchon in the definition, two notable proposals are (I) 
that huparchon refers to a fact (pragma) or to what is true, which was put forth 
by Frede, and (2) that it refers to the corporeal object simpliciter that is causing 
the impression. In my opinion, option (2) has been successfully criticized by 
Sedley, "Zeno's Definition of phantasia kataleptike" (although I d isagree with his 
proposed solution to treat the apo in the definition as having representational and 
not causal meaning). Option (I) is problematic because it seems that the Stoics 
thought that facts and what is true are incorporeal (cf. SE M 8. 1 2  = LS 33B) and as 
such they cannot cause apprehensive impressions because the Stoics thought that 
only corporeals can be causes (aitia, Aet. 1 . 1 1 . 5 = LS SSG; cf. Cic. Acad. 1 . 39 = LS 
45A; SE M 8.263 = LS 4SB).  My rendering of huparchon as referring to a qualified 
corporeal object, or poion, differs from both interpretations. 
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it seems that the Stoics used the word huparchon to refer to the real, corporeal 
object that causes the impression and is its "impressor" (phantaston).l However, 
since they thought that corporeal objects are always qualified in some way, i.e. 
that their corporeal substance always possesses some properties or "qualities" 
(poiotes), huparchon here should be taken to refer not to the corporeal object 
simpliciter, but to a poion, a corporeal object that is qualified in a particular way, 
that is, to the corporeal object together with its corporeal properties. Because of 
its focus on what causes the impressions, let us call this the Causal Requirement. 
In addition to being caused by something existent, the apprehensive 
impression also has to be in accordance with its impressor, i.e. with the thing 
that caused it. An impression is in accordance with its impressor when the 
predicates in the impression's propositional content correspond to the actual 
properties of the impressor. For example, if the impression with the propositional 
content "Dion is walking" was caused by Dion who is actually walking, then the 
impression would be in accordance with its impressor because the predicate " . . .  
is walking" would correctly represent Dion's property of walking; on the other 
hand, if it was caused by Dion who is, for example, sitting, then it would not be 
in accordance with its impressor because the predicate " . . .  is walking" would not 
correctly represent Dion's property of sitting. 8 Let us call this the Accordance 
Requirement. 
Finally, the impression that is caused by an existent thing and is in 
accordance with it in addition has to be "of such a kind as could not come 
about from something that was not existent': This third requirement emerged 
7 Aet. 4. 1 2. 1 -5 = LS 39B4. 
8 Cf. Stobaeus 1 . 1  06, 1 8-23  = LS 5 1  B4. The Stoics thought that predicates are 
paradigmatically expressed by verbs (cf. DL 7.58;  Ammon. In Ar. De int. 44. 1 9-
45.6). From the summary account of Stoic logic in DL 7.49-83 where a number of 
examples of propositions occurs, it looks like they made a conscious effort to avoid 
expressing predicates in the form of copula + adjective or copula + noun. However, 
a few examples of propositions that contain such predicates occur in Stoic contexts. 
Some examples are propositions "This [man] is kind" (philanthropos estin autos, 
DL 7.70}, "Dion is a horse'; "Dion is an animal" (hippos esti Dian, zaon esti Dian, 
DL 7.78 ), "Something is a man" (ti estin anthrapos, SE M 1 1 .8}. No surviving 
source reports on how the Stoics understood predicates in such propositions. If 
they strictly held to the doctrine that predicates should be properly expressed 
only by verbs, then perhaps they thought that every expression of the form copula 
+ adjective or copula + noun is only a loose paraphrase of the corresponding 
verbal form. It seems to me, however, that this uncertainty does not affect the 
main points of my analysis of moral impressions-like, for example, "prudence is 
good"-whose predicates are often expressed in the form copula+ adjective/noun. 
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from the lengthy debate the Stoics led with their chief opponents, the skeptical 
Academics. The Academics argued that unless the apprehensive impression is 
capable of distinguishing between two extremely similar but different objects, 
then it couldn't provide foundations for the achievement of the demanding ideal 
of knowledge of the Sage. For example, if the Sage's impression were to report 
"This tall man wearing a skull-cap is Castor" even in the situation in which the 
impression was caused by Castor's twin brother Polydeuces," then the Sage 
would not have apprehension (katalepsis), which is a necessary step towards 
achieving knowledge (episteme).10 The Sage never assents to nonapprehensive 
impressions because even in cases when they are true, they could nevertheless 
turn out false.1 1 That is why the third requirement is sometimes formulated 
as stating that the apprehensive impression is "of such a kind that it could not 
become false". In other words, the apprehensive impression has to be true not 
only at the time it is entertained, but always, which is what makes it unmistakable. 
One way of understanding this requirement is that unlike true nonapprehensive 
impressions, which are true in actual situations, apprehensive impressions are 
true in all counterfactual situations as well. In cases involving impressions about 
morally neutral things like discriminating between extremely similar but distinct 
particular objects, the Stoics relied on the principle that each existent object 
is ontologically unique to ensure that this requirement is met. Their strategy 
was to argue that given that every corporeal object is ontologically unique, 
apprehension is possible because the apprehensive impression captures that 
uniqueness and guarantees that no apprehensive impression could mistakenly 
represent its impressor. Since it is able to capture the ontological uniqueness of 
its impressor, the apprehensive impression about Castor would be such that, if it 
were caused by Castor, it would represent its impressor as being Castor, and if it 
were not caused by Castor (but, for example, by his twin Polydeuces), it would 
not represent its impressor as being Castor. Thus, it would allow the person 
entertaining such an impression to discriminate between actual situations 
in which the content of their impression is true and possible counterfactual 
9 As mythical twin brothers known for their extreme similarity, Castor and 
Polydeuces were often used by the Academics in their arguments against the Stoic 
theory of the apprehensive impression, e.g. in SE M 7.4 1 0  ( = LS 40H 4). 
I 0 The Stoics considered knowledge to be a system of assents to apprehensive 
impressions that are not changeable by reason (Stob. 2 .73, 1 9-2 1 = LS 4 1 HI; cf. 
Stob. 2 . 1 1 1 , 1 8- 1 1 2,8 = LS 4 1 G) .  
II  SE M 7. 1 52 = LS 4 1  C4 ;  cf.  Cic. A cad. 2 . 1 1 2 . It i s  important to note that for the 
Stoics the truth value is a temporal property of impressions (see Bobzien, "Logic'; 
87-88), i.e. a same impression that is true at one time (e.g. "It is day" when indeed 
it is day) can be false at another (e.g. "It is day" when it is in fact night) . 
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situations in which the content of their impression would be false. Because of 
this, let us call this the Discrimination Requirement. 1 2  
Therefore, we can conclude that the Stoics thought that an impression 
is apprehensive if and only if it meets the following three requirements: 
II. 
(1) The Causal Requirement: the impression must be caused 
by an impressor that is existent; 
(2) The Accordance Requirement: the actual properties of its 
impressor must be represented by the corresponding 
predicates correctly in the impression; 
(3) The Discrimination Requirement: the impression must be 
such that it enables the subject to discriminate between 
actual situations in which the content of the impression is 
true and possible counterfactual situations in which its 
content would be false. 
In the surviving texts about Stoicism, a vast majority of examples of 
apprehensive impressions are of those that refer to morally neutral states of 
affairs. Typically, they rely on cases of discriminating between extremely similar 
but distinct objects we have mentioned in the previous section. Apprehensive 
impressions are also mentioned in Arrian's report on Epictetus's philosophy, 
although only a few times. 1 3  One place in particular, however, suggests that 
Epictetus thought that apprehensive impressions about moral states of affairs 
exist, and that they are necessary for the achievement of moral and practical 
perfection. In Diss. 3.8.1-4, Epictetus is reported as say ing: 
In the same way as we exercise ourselves to deal with 
sophistical questionings, we should exercise ourselves daily 
to deal with impressions [phantasias], for these too face us 
with questions. So-and-so's son is dead. Answer, "That lies 
outside the sphere of choice, it is not a bad thing [kakon]:' 
So-and-so has been disinherited by his father; what do you 
think of that? "That lies outside the sphere of choice, it is not 
a bad thing:' Caesar has condemned him. "That lies outside 
the sphere of choice, it is not a bad thing:' He was grieved by 
all this. "That lies outside the sphere of choice, it is not a bad 
thing:' He has borne it nobly. "That lies within the sphere of 
12 My choice of the name for this requirement is an homage to Alvin Goldman, 
"Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge'; who has formulated a similar 
requirement for the reliability of perceptual knowledge. 
1 3  As far as I can see there are only three occurrences: Diss. 3.8 .5, 4.4. 1 3, and 
Ench. 45. 
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choice, it is a good thing [agathon ]:' If we acquire this habit, 
we shall make progress [prokopsomen]; for we shall never 
assent to anything unless we get an apprehensive impression 
[phantasia kataleptike] of it. 
Impressions that Epictetus talks about here are the ones that attribute 
moral predicates, for example "good" and "bad", to things like someone's death, 
someone's disinheritance by his own father, someone's condemnation by a 
powerful person such as Caesar, someone's distress about these calamities, and 
someone's endurance in the face of them. According to him, one could 
achieve moral progress (prokope) only if one acquired the habit of assenting to 
apprehensive impressions about morally relevant things, which, as we have seen 
in section I above, means impressions that correctly and unmistakably attribute 
moral predicates to impressors, i.e. things that cause the impressions. Correct 
attribution of predicates to impressors, or "the application of preconceptions 
to particulars" as Epictetus often calls it, is one of the central themes in his 
philosophy. In several places (Diss. 1.2.6, 22.2-9; 2.11.3-12, 17.6-16; 4.1.41-45) 
he discusses the application of moral "preconceptions" (prolepseis) such as 
good (agathon), bad (kakon), advantageous (sumpheron), disadvantageous 
(asumphoron), just (dikaion), courageous (andreios), etc. to particular actions. 1 4  
They were called "preconceptions" because Epictetus, like other Stoics, believed 
that, unlike typically nonmoral concepts such as, e.g., "white': that are acquired 
through instruction and attention,1' moral concepts develop from our natural 
14 Epictetus sometimes also talks about nonmoral preconceptions, for example 
about the preconception of the philosopher, the carpenter, the musician, etc. (Diss. 
4.8.6- 1 0). However, most contexts where he discusses the correct application of 
preconceptions to particulars are cases of moral preconceptions. 
IS Cf. Aet. 4. 1 1 . 1 -4 = LS 39E. The Stoics made a technical distinction between the 
notions of "conception" (ennoia) and "concept" (ennoi!ma) . As Aetius reports, 
according to them, ennoia refers to the physical processes in the corporeal soul 
that occur when we think of something (cf. also Plut. Com. not. 1 084F- 1 085A 
= LS 39F), while ennoi!ma is the incorporeal result of that process. The Stoics 
clearly thought that the ontological status of ennoi!mata was questionable. They 
called them "figments" (phantasmata, Stob. 1 . 1 36,2 1 - 1 37,6 = LS 30A; DL 7.60 
= LS 30C 1 -2), entities that are analogue to purely fictional things like Centaurs. 
Accordingly, it seems that they thought that all propositions involving concepts 
should be understood as paraphrases of conditional propositions that range over 
corporeal particulars (see end of section III below) . For example, the proposition 
"Man is a rational mortal animal" involving the concept "man" should be 
understood as a paraphrase of the conditional "If something is a man, that thing 
is a rational mortal animal". Presumably, the word "man" in the conditional no 
longer refers to a concept, but to the common quality possessed by all men ( cf. DL 
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inborn tendencies to pursue things that are in accordance with our nature, and 
to stay away from the things that are not.'" In keeping with the Stoic orthodoxy, 
Epictetus also calls them "innate concepts" (emphutoi ennoiai, Diss. 2.11.3) and 
claims that, because of their innateness: 
Preconceptions are common to all men, and one 
preconception does not contradict another. For who among 
us does not assume that the good [agathon] is profitable 
and something to be chosen [haireton], and that in every 
circumstance we ought to seek and pursue it? [Diss. 1.22.1 
= LS 40S1] 
For who does not have a preconception of bad [kakou], that 
it is harmful, that it is to be avoided [pheukton], that it is 
something to get rid of in every way? [Diss. 4.1.44] 
However, although moral preconceptions do not contradict each other, 
conflicts often arise when we try to apply them to particulars. For example, 
members of different cultures have the same preconception of piety, that it is 
something that should be put above all else and pursued in all circumstances. 
The conflict arises when people try to apply the preconception of piety to 
particulars such as someone's act of eating pork: one believes that someone's 
act of eating pork is pious, another that it is impious (Diss. 1.22.4). Since these 
conflicting beliefs cannot both be true, Epictetus argues that, just as in the case 
of deciding whether some object is black or soft we use a criterion to determine 
the truth, we should have a criterion for deciding which of our moral beliefs 
are true (Diss. 1.11.9-15). This criterion cannot be mere opining (dokein), but 
something higher (an6teros) than mere opining (Diss. 2.11.11-12). Although 
Epictetus does not explicitly name it, he does think that such a criterion exists 
(Diss. 2.11.17). Since the Stoics thought that the apprehensive impression is 
7.58 = LS 33M).  Since this quality is something corporeal, the predicate "is man" 
in this sense can be predicated of something without ontological complications 
(see n. 8 above for Stoic understanding of predicates) .  If Epictetus is following 
the Stoic classification of "preconceptions" (proli!pseis) and concepts (ennoenwta) 
under the same genus, then applying moral preconceptions to particulars would 
seem to amount to predicating the incorporeal products of the process of moral 
conception (ennoia) to particular corporeal objects. 
16 Although this has been subject to controversy (see, e.g., Sand bach, "Ennoia and 
flPOAH'I'II in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge"), I think that jackson-McCabe 
("The Stoic Theory of Implanted Preconceptions") has persuasively argued 
that Epictetus's position on the innateness of moral preconceptions was fully in 
agreement with the doctrines of the early Stoics. 
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the criterion of truth,17 and since Epictetus believed that moral apprehensive 
impressions are possible, I think we can conclude that the criterion Epictetus 
had in mind here was the moral apprehensive impression. 
In addition to the evidence that Epictetus might have thought that 
apprehensive moral impressions exist, there is some indirect evidence that 
this idea was not Epictetus's own invention, but a part of the orthodox Stoic 
doctrine. The well-attested orthodox Stoic approach to defining virtues and 
vices as instances of knowledge and ignorance, 1" which was a part of the 
doctrine from the very beginning, suggests that the early Stoics too thought that 
moral impressions could be apprehensive. They defined prudence as knowledge 
(episteme) of what is good, bad, indifferent, or neither of these,19 and thought 
that this knowledge is related to how kathekonta, or befitting actions, come into 
being.211 We know that for the Stoics, episteme is not only a system of beliefs that 
are firm and unshakable, but also a system of beliefs composed of assents to 
only one type of impressions: those that are apprehensive.21 It follows then that 
prudence is a system of firm assents to impressions about what things are good, 
bad, indifferent or neither, i.e. of assents to moral impressions about good, bad, 
etc. things that must be apprehensiveY Therefore, it seems that there are some 
1 7  DL 7.54 = LS 40A; SE M 7. 1 52 = LS 4 1 C5 .  
18  Stab. 2 .59,4-60,8 = LS 6 1 Hl-5 (partially)= IG 1 02 .5b 1 ;  cf. DL 7.92-93, which, 
despite the lacuna in 92, undoubtedly reports virtues as being defined in terms of 
knowledge and vices in terms of ignorance. 
1 9  DL 7.92; Stab. 2 . 59,4-7 = LS 6 1 H 1  = IG 1 02 .5bl. 
20 ten men phronesin peri ta kathekonta ginesthai, Stab. 2 .60, 1 2  = IG 2 . 1 02.5b2. 
21 Stab. 2 .73, 1 6-74, 1 3  = LS 41H = IG 1 02 .51. 
22 Apparently, for the Stoics, prudence occupied a special place among the virtues. 
For example, it seems that Zeno used to define the other three virtues in terms 
of prudence (Piut. Virt. mar. 44 1 A  = LS 6 1 B5; St. rep. 1 034C = LS 6 1 C 1-2) ,  and 
Apollophanes even went so far as to claim that prudence is the only virtue (DL 
7.92 ) .  This is not surprising given that the Stoics thought that al l  cardinal virtues 
(prudence, temperance, justice, and courage) are physically inseparable and 
that they differ only in their respective topics (Stab. 2 .63,6-64, 1 2  = LS 6 1  D & 
63G = IG 1 02.5b5; DL 7. 1 25- 1 26) .  Namely, they defined temperance as a virtue 
primarily concerned with impulses ( Stab. 2 .60, 1 3  = IG 2 . 1 02.5b2),  which consists 
in knowledge of what is worth choosing (haireton), what is worth avoiding 
(pheukton), and what is indifferent (oudeteron) (Stab. 2 .59,8-9 = LS 6 1H2 = 
IG 1 02.5b 1 ) ;  also, they defined courage as the virtue that concerns instances 
of standing firm (peri tas hupomonas, Stab. 2 .60, 1 4) .  It is not hard to see how 
temperance and courage can both be based on prudence, i.e. on judgments 
that something is good, bad, or indifferent, because the Stoics defined good 
things as those that are worth choosing (haireta) and worth standing firmly 
by (hupomeneta), and bad things as the opposites of these (Stab. 2 .78,7- 1 7  = 
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reasons to think that the existence of moral apprehensive impressions and their 
importance for moral action was not Epictetus's invention, but a Stoic orthodoxy. 
III. 
We have seen that there is some evidence that Epictetus thought that 
moral apprehensive impressions exist, and that it is possible that in this he 
was following the earlier Stoics. Unfortunately, no detailed accounts of these 
impressions have been preserved in the surviving texts. In the remainder of this 
essay, I will attempt to provide a reconstruction of how Epictetus and perhaps the 
other Stoics might have understood moral apprehensive impressions by relying 
on their theory of nonmoral apprehensive impressions and other relevant parts 
of their philosophical doctrine. However, the reader should keep in mind that, 
because of the lack of direct textual evidence, this reconstruction will necessarily 
have to involve some level of speculation. 
In the previous section, we have suggested that moral apprehensive 
impressions are impressions that correctly and unmistakably predicate some 
moral property of some object. In other words, the paradigmatic form of the 
moral apprehensive impression would be "x is M", where x is some particular 
corporeal object and M is a predicate corresponding to some moral property 
possessed by the object. If so, then moral apprehensive impressions would be 
very similar to nonmoral apprehensive impressions. This should not be very 
surprising since according to the Stoics, moral objects and moral properties 
are an integral part of the corporeal world, and the location problem for moral 
properties does not arise in their metaphysicsY They claimed that all moral 
objects, for example, particular instances of prudence, temperance, courage, etc. ,  
are corporeal,2 4 and that everything that is good is a body.25 Furthermore, since 
actions as dispositions of particular agents' corporeal souls are also corporeal 
objects, they are properties of agents' corporeal substance. Because of this, the 
Stoics say that, just like nonmoral properties, moral properties such as being 
good and being bad huparchein, i.e. "exist" or "belong" to objects,26 and thus 
provide a basis for truthful, substantial predication of moral predicates to 
particular objects.27 Consequently, moral apprehensive impressions, just like 
nonmoral ones, are caused by huparchonta, i .e. by existent, particular corporeal 
IG 1 02.6£) .  Consequentially, this would mean that they thought that all virtues 
depended on the knowledge of what is good, bad, indifferent or neither, i.e. on 
apprehensive impressions of the form "x is M'. 
23 For one example of an influential discussion of the location problem for ethics, see 
jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, especially chapters 1 and 5. 
24  Stob. 2 .64,20-22 = IG 1 02 .5b7. 
25  Sen. Ep. 1 1 7.2  = LS 60S. 
26 Stob. 2.68,24-25 = IG 1 02.5c .  
27  Cf. Stob. 2 .97, 1 9-2 1 = LS 33) 1 = IG 1 02 . 1 1 f. 
Pavle Stojanovic 173 
objects, as is testified by many impressions offered by Epictetus as illustrations 
in his discussion of the correct application of preconceptions to particulars, for 
example, "So-and-so's son's death is not bad", "So-and-so's disinheritance is not 
bad", "His grief because of all this is bad", "His standing firm in the face of all 
this is good", etc.2" For this reason, moral apprehensive impressions of the form 
"xis M" would have no problem meeting the Causal Requirement we described 
in section I above, which states that apprehensive impressions must be caused 
by something huparchon. In addition, since the Stoics thought that apprehensive 
impressions, as impressions caused by huparchonta that accurately represent 
their objects, express states of affairs or facts (pragmata), they probably thought 
that moral apprehensive impressions, which are also caused by huparchonta and 
accurately represent their objects, express moral states of affairs or moral facts. 
In other words, for the Stoics, that Dion's prudence is good is a fact as much as 
the fact that Dion's hair is brown. 
On the other hand, even if some impressions of the form "xis M" have 
the capacity of being apprehensive this does not imply that all moral impressions 
have the same capacity. Obviously, moral impressions that falsely attribute some 
moral property to their impressors-such as, for example, the impression that 
Dion's cowardice is good-cannot be apprehensive.2" What is less obvious but 
very important for our present discussion, however, is that since according to 
the Stoics no universal impression can be apprehensive, no universal moral 
impression can be apprehensive either. This point may seem surprisingly strong 
given the abundance and the importance of universal moral statements in the 
extant texts on Stoic ethics. Nevertheless, our evidence clearly suggests that the 
Stoics thought that universals are concepts (ennoemata) and that concepts are 
not existent things or huparchonta, only mere figments (phantasmata) of our 
mind/" so as such they cannot cause apprehensive impressions. As we have 
seen in section I, the Casual Requirement clearly prevents any impression that 
is caused by "empty attraction" from being apprehensive, and according to the 
Stoics, figments are things we are attracted to in empty attractions." Accordingly, 
unlike impressions of the form "xis M" (for example, "Dion's prudence is good"), 
which are impressions about corporeal particulars (in our example, Dion's 
prudence), impressions of the form "X isM" (for example, "Prudence is good"), 
which are impressions about universals (in our example, the generic Prudence), 
cannot be apprehensive because they are impressions caused by figments of the 
mind. In other words, although particular moral facts exist in the Stoic universe, 
universal moral facts do not. 
28 Cf. Diss. 3.8 . 1 -4. 
29 In section V below we will discuss another class of moral impressions that are true, 
but nevertheless fail to be apprehensive. 
30 Aet. 1 . 1 0 .5  = LS 30B; Stob. 1 . 136,2 1 - 1 37,6 = LS 30A; DL 7.6 1 = LS 30C2. 
31 Aet. 4 . 1 2 . 1 -5 = LS 39B; cf. DL 7.49-50 = LS 39AI-3. 
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This, of course, does not imply that impressions about universals are 
superfluous and useless. On the contrary, since all definitions and divisions 
have the form of universal impressions, they are basic tools in Stoic logic 
and dialectic, and ultimately provide foundations for the Sage's knowledge. 32 
Namely, the Stoics considered universal impressions to be useful paraphrases of 
conditionals that involve impressions about particulars. According to them, all 
universal moral impressions of the form "X is M" are generalized impressions 
(katholika) that stand for impressions expressing conditionals "if x is X, then 
xis M': 33 For example, the universal impression "prudence is good" would stand 
for the impression "if some particular thing is prudent, then that thing is good". 
Furthermore, they thought that universal impressions can be true, and that their 
truth depends on the truth of the impressions about particulars over which they 
range; for example, "Prudence is good" is true if and only if all particular prudent 
things are good. Thus, although themselves nonapprehensive, universal moral 
impressions of the form "X is M" and their truth-values crucially depend on 
particular moral impressions of the form "xis M': and the latter, as we have seen, 
are capable of being apprehensive. Consequently, knowledge of universal moral 
truths can be secured through the apprehension of particular moral truths, that 
is, through moral apprehensive impressions of the form "xis M'. 
IV. 
In the previous section, I have argued that Epictetus and the Stoics 
would have probably thought that the moral apprehensive impression shares 
some important similarities with the nonmoral apprehensive impression: they 
are both caused by existent objects, and they are both perceptual impressions 
about corporeal objects. In this section, I would like to suggest that there is 
one crucial difference between moral and nonmoral apprehensive impressions. 
Namely, it seems that the Stoics thought that, unlike nonmoral apprehensive 
impressions that are merely descriptions of their impressors, moral apprehensive 
impressions are not only descriptions, but also evaluations of corporeal objects . 34 
32 See, e.g., DL 7.60-62 = LS 32C and Aug. Civ. dei 8.7 = LS 32F; cf. Long, "Dialectic 
and the Stoic Sage': 
33 SE M 11.8-11 = LS 30!. 
34 Accepting this dual nature of moral impressions might cause some reluctance 
among those contemporary meta-ethicists used to sharp distinctions between 
descriptions and evaluations. However, I see no reason to attribute some form of 
such distinction to the Stoics. This is not a sign that, unlike contemporary ethicists, 
they did not understand the importance of this distinction. On the contrary, I 
think that their idea that some descriptions are also at the same time evaluations 
was a sophisticated philosophical maneuver that (if successful) allowed them to 
avoid many problems that plague contemporary meta-ethicists participating in the 
debate about ethical cognitivism and noncognitivism. 
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This dual nature of moral impressions is the result of the Stoic theory of the 
innate origin of moral concepts we have already mentioned. Although they 
refer to corporeal moral properties of objects, there is some evidence that 
the Stoics thought that moral predicates also carry meanings35 that indicate 
the agent's potential pursuit-type or evasion-type stance towards corporeal 
objects that possess these properties. In other words, it seems that according 
to the Stoics, every moral predicate is not only a descriptive predicate, but also 
an evaluative predicate. That's why they say that, for example, everything that 
is good (agathon) is also "worth choosing" (haireton), and everything that is 
bad (kakon) is worth avoiding (pheukton),36 and, accordingly, that everything 
that has some nonabsolute value (axia) is also "worth taking" (lepton), and 
everything that has some disvalue (apaxia) is "worth not taking" (alepton).37 
The general idea behind this dual function of evaluative predicates is that some 
object is, for example, valuable to us not simply because we think of it as being 
worthy of taking, but because it really possesses properties that contribute to our 
nature and well-being, just as, for example, food satisfies our hunger not simply 
because we think so, but because of the nutrients that are really contained in 
it. Thus, since moral predicates are both descriptive and evaluative, the Stoics 
thought that the impression that, for example, some xis good not only describes 
x as being good, but also at the same time evaluates x as being worth choosing, 
i.e. as the potential object of some agent's choice. 3B It is by virtue of this dual 
function of moral predicates that moral impressions provide the basis for action, 
which will be discussed in section V below. 
The evaluative nature of moral impressions in Stoicism and the 
possibility of moral apprehensive impressions have recently caused considerable 
controversies in interpreting the Stoic position,  so I will devote the rest of this 
section to solving some of these controversies. Gisela Striker has argued that 
for the Stoics, evaluative predicates are not perceptual/" and that apprehensive 
impressions must be perceptuaJ, 4" from which she concluded that moral! 
evaluative impressions cannot be apprehensive. Brennan accepts Striker's first 
35 The Stoics did make the d istinction between the meaning of a word, "the 
signification" (semainomenon), and the corporeal thing it refers to, "the name­
bearer" (tunchanon); see, for example, M 8 . 1 1 - 1 2  = LS 33B. 
36 Stob. 2 .72, 1 9-20 = IG 1 02.5i .  
37 Stob. 2 .79, 1 8-80,2 1 = IG 1 02 .7a-b; 82,20-84,3 = IG 1 02 .7e-f; 84, 1 8-85, 1 1  = JG 
1 02 .7g. 
38 Stob. 2 .75, 1 - 6  = JG 1 02.5o; 80, 1 4-2 1 = IG 1 02 .7b; 82,20-83,9 = IG 1 02 .7e. 
That concepts like haireton and pheukton represent parts of the meanings of 
preconceptions "good" and "bad" is suggested by Epict. Diss. 1 .2 2 . 1  = LS 405 I and 
4 . 1 .44 (quoted above) .  
39 "Skeptical Strategies", 70-72. 
40 Striker, "KptT�ptov T�<; UAfltlda.;'; 73-76. 
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premise (that moral/evaluative impressions are nonperceptual) ,  but disagrees 
with her conclusion (that all moral/evaluative impressions are nonapprehensive) ,  
so he is led to deny Striker's second premise, that all apprehensive impressions 
must be perceptual. 41 Both views get something right about the Stoic position, 
but ultimately rely on the premise that the Stoics thought that impressions 
cannot be both perceptual and evaluative. This premise is, as I will argue, false. 
Namely, according to Plutarch: 
[Chrysippus] says that goods and bads [tagatha kai ta kaka] 
are perceptible [aistheta], writing as follows in On the end 
book I :  ' [ . . .  ] Not only are the passions [pathe], grief and fear 
and the like, perceptible along with [people's] appearances, 
but also it is possible to perceive theft and adultery and 
similar things, and in general, folly and cowardice and many 
other vices, and not only joy and benefactions and many 
other instances of right conduct [katorthaseon] but also 
prudence and courage and the remaining virtues:42 
The passage clearly states that Chrysippus thought that moral 
properties of corporeal objects, such as being good or being bad, are 
perceptible:' Furthermore, it seems that he also thought that particular 
instantiations of actions, such as right actions (katorthamata), are perceptible 
as well. It is important to note that Chrysippus does not say only that actions 
in general (energeia) are perceptible, but also that right actions are perceived 
as right and vicious actions as vicious, which implies that they are perceived 
in an evaluative way. In addition, at another place Chrysippus is cited as saying 
that "appropriation" (oikeiosis), another important Stoic evaluative concept, is 
perception ( aisthesis) of what is appropriate. 44 
All this suggests that the Stoics thought that impressions attributing 
evaluative predicates to corporeal objects are perceptual. In fact, this is not 
surprising given the Stoics' position on the relationship between properties 
of corporeal objects and predicates in perceptual impressions about these 
objects . Namely, according to them, moral properties of the corporeal object 
cause evaluative predicates in the perceptual impression about the object in 
exactly the same way in which nonmoral properties of the corporeal object 
41 Brennan, The Stoic Life, 75-79. 
42 Plut. St. rep. 1 042E-F = LS 60R. 
43 Contra Brennan (The Stoic Life, 76), who seems to think that being good is a 
property that is nonperceptual. 
44 Plut. St. rep. 1 038C; this is in direct contradiction with Brennan's claim ("Stoic 
Epistemology': 324) that the property of being oikeion is a nonperceptual property. 
For the Stoic concept of oikei<Jsis, see e.g. DL 7.85-86 = LS 57 A. 
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cause descriptive predicates in the descriptive impression about the object. For 
example, Zeno is reported as saying that corporeal instantiations of prudence 
(phronesis) and temperance (sophrosune) in objects cause moral predicates 
"being prudent" (phronein) and "being temperate" (sophronein) in impressions 
about these objects. 45 Since moral impressions of the form "x is M' -which 
are, as we have seen, at the same time evaluative-are caused by properties of 
corporeal objects, there is no reason to assume that the Stoics thought that they 
cannot be perceptual. 
The likely motivation behind the resistance towards the idea that 
evaluative predicates are perceptual might lie in certain elements of the Stoic 
theory of the origin of moral concepts. Namely, according to Diogenes Laertius, 
the Stoics thought that all impressions obtained through sense organs are 
perceptual (aisthetikai), while nonperceptual (auk aisthetikai) impressions are 
those obtained through thought, for example impressions about "incorporeals 
and other things acquired by reason': 46 Although moral impressions of the form 
"x is M' are impressions about corporeal objects obtained through sense organs, 
it is not hard to assume that all impressions that involve moral concepts 
nevertheless fall into the category of nonperceptual because the Stoics thought 
that moral concepts, unlike descriptive ones such as "white", are innate, formed 
from the principles within us, 47 and acquired spontaneously. 48 The fact that the 
meanings of evaluative concepts possess an element that does not come from 
the senses, however, does not imply that evaluative concepts are non perceptual, 
at least not in any sense of the notion of "non perceptual" that the Stoics would 
use. Although evaluative concepts partially originate from the innate principles 
in us, the Stoics thought that their purpose and applications are inseparable 
from perceptual objects. 49 In fact, as Diogenes himself reveals later, 5" by "other 
things acquired by reason" the Stoics most likely had in mind nonevident things 
45 Stob. 1.138,14-139,4 = LS SSA. In SE M 9.211 = LS SSB and Clem. Strom. 
8.9.26.3-4 = LS SSC, the same explanation is offered for the causal origin of purely 
descriptive predicates such as "being cut", "being burn( etc. There is no indication 
that the Stoics thought that the causal origin of moral predicates is in any way 
different from that of nonmoral predicates. 
46 DL 7.51 = LS 39A4. 
47 Plut. Comm. not. 1070C. 
48 Aet. 4.11.1-4 = LS 39E. 
49 In Fin. 3.20-22 = LS 590, for example, Cicero explains how the function of the 
concepts such as "valuable" (aestimabile, Gr. axian) and "befitting" (officium, Gr. 
kathekon), after they develop from the "starting-points of nature': is to enable us 
to actually select objects that are valuable and to perform befitting actions. Indeed, 
it is hard to see how one could even develop the concept of something valuable 
without perceiving valuable objects. 
50 OL 7.53 = LS 3907. 
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(adela) that are conceived through "transition" (metabasis) from perceptual 
things via sign inference or demonstration, for example, like when by perceiving 
sweat we conceive unperceivable pores in the skin. 51 Because of this, I think it is 
best to conclude that the Stoics thought that non perceptual impressions are only 
those impressions that are about nonevident things and incorporeal objects. 
However, as we have seen above, the Stoics understood moral apprehensive 
impressions as impressions about particular corporeal objects, and moral 
properties as perceivable corporeal properties of those objects. Therefore, it 
seems that they would classify moral apprehensive impressions among the 
perceptual impressions. 
v. 
So far, we have argued that there is evidence that the Stoics thought 
that moral impressions are both descriptions and evaluations of corporeal 
objects, and that there are no obstacles to assuming that the Stoics classified 
them as perceptual impressions. In this section, we will discuss another group 
of evaluative impressions-those that have the form "it befits A to do K'' or "K 
is befitting for A': that is, impressions that some particular action K is kathekon 
for the agent A-because the Stoics thought that a subclass of impressions of this 
form, called "impulsive impressions", provides the basis for rational action. First 
of all, let me say that given everything we have said so far, there is nothing in the 
Stoic system that prevents at least some impressions of the form "it befits A to 
do K'' or "K is befitting for A", that is, impressions that some particular action K 
is kathekon for the agent A, from being apprehensive. Several places in Epictetus 
mention such impressions: for example, "it will befit it [viz. the foot] to step 
into mud", 52 or "it befits you now to be sick, and now to make a voyage and run 
risks, and now to be in want, and on occasion to die before your time': 53 They are 
all examples ofimpressions that evaluate some corporeal thing, that is, a particular 
action of some agent, as being befitting. For example, in the impression "it befits 
Dion to make a voyage", Dion's act of making the voyage is a corporeal object that 
is being evaluated as something befitting for Dion. In this respect, impressions 
that state that some action of the agent is befitting are a species of the genus of 
moral impressions of the form "x is M', so there is no reason to assume that the 
Stoics would have thought that they are incapable of being apprehensive. 
51 See, for example, SE M 9.393-394; the Stoic origin is suggested by mentioning 
the same methods of conceiving things (similarity, composition, analogy, 
transposition) listed in DL 7.53. On conceiving nonevident things from perceptual 
things via sign inference and demonstration, see e.g. SE PH 2.104-106 = LS 35C, 
2.140 = LS 3687. 
52 Diss. 2.5.24: kathexei auton eis pelon embainein. 
53 Diss. 2.5.25: nun men soi nosesai kathekei, nun de pleusai kai kinduneusai, nun d' 
aporethenai, pro hiiras d' estin hot' apothanein. Cf. also Ench. 42. 
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Does this mean that for the Stoics, impulsive impressions, as a species 
of the genus of impressions of the form "it befits A to do K", are also capable of 
being apprehensive? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is much harder 
to discern, but it seems that there are reasons to think that they aren't. According 
to Stobaeus, the Stoics thought that all rational action is initiated by "an 
impulsive impression [phantasia hormetike] of something immediately befitting 
[kathekontos]"/4 i.e. by assent to such an impression, which activates the agent's 
impulse (horme) towards the befitting action . The befitting action mentioned in 
the impulsive impression is expressed in the form of a predicate (kategorema), 
always as a verb in infinitive, for example, "being prudent" (phronein) or "going 
on an embassy" (presbeuiein).'' Presumably, the role of the word "immediately" 
(auto then) in Stobaeus's report indicates that the Stoics thought that the impulsive 
impression also contains an indexical element (something like "for me, now") ,  
whose function is  to associate the kathekon in the impulsive impression with the 
particular agent entertaining the impression and the practical context in which 
his action is to be executed.56 Thus, for the Stoics, impulsive impressions most 
likely had the form " it befits me to K now': where K is the agent's potential action 
expressed as a predicate. Note that impulsive impressions are very similar to 
the impressions of the form "it befits A to do K', i.e. that some agent's action 
is befitting, which we've discussed in the previous paragraph. The difference 
between these and impulsive impressions is that the latter are always entertained 
in the agent's first-person perspective. For example, the impression "it befits me 
to be sick" (kathekei moi nosesai)57 is impulsive, while the impression "it befits 
54 phantasian hometiken tau kathekontos autothen, Stob. 2.86,17-8 = LS 53 Q I = 
IG 102.9. This formulation has inspired Brennan ("Stoic Moral Psychology'; 
268) to argue that impulsive impressions typically have the form "it is K that p", 
where K stands for kathekon (or other relevant terms such as oikeion, eulogon, or 
sumpheron), and p stands for some candidate action. 
55 Cf. Stob. 2.86,1-7 = IG 102.8-8a. 
56 See LS 2.318, comm. on 53Q. 
57 This seems to be supported by another set of Epictetus's examples. In Diss. 1.22.14, 
he mentions several impressions linked in a conditional: "if it profits me to have 
a farm [sumpherei moi agron echein], then it profits me to take it away from my 
neighbor [sumpherei moi kai aphelesthai au ton tou plesionJ; if it profits me to 
have a cloak [sumpherei moi himation echein], then it profits me to steal it from 
a bath [sumpherei moi kai klepsai auto ek balaneiour For Epictetus, impressions 
that something is profitable (sumpheron) have the same motivational function as 
impressions that something is kathekon (Diss. 1.18.1; 1.28.5; cf. Brennan, "Stoic 
Moral Psychology", 268). If every action that is sumplzeron is also kathekon, then it 
seems that Epictetus thought that impulsive impressions in Greek have the form 
kathekei moi + action that is to be performed. This is also confirmed by certain 
instances in Seneca, for example, in Ep. 113.18: "It befits me to walk" (oportet me 
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you to be sick'' or "being sick is befitting" isn't. The reason is that my assent 
to the impressions " it befits to be sick'' or " it befits you to be sick now" need 
not cause me to do anything, because the former would be an impression 
about a universal fact that it kathekei to be sick in general, while the latter 
would be an impression of what kathekei to you, not of what kathekei to me. 
Stobaeus reports that the impulsive impression is an impression "of something 
immediately kathekon", which, as we have seen, means that it necessarily has 
to be an impression of what is kathekon to me as the agent who is performing 
the action. 
However, this difference in perspective that distinguishes impulsive 
impressions from non- impulsive impressions that something is kathekon seems 
to prevent impulsive impressions from being apprehensive. Namely, we have 
already mentioned that my impulse towards some potential action is stimulated 
by my assent to the impulsive impression that some action is befitting for 
me.5 8 According to the Stoics, my impulse is directed towards the predicate 
in the impulsive impression identified as being kathekon,59 and eo ipso results 
in my acquiring the property that corresponds to the action expressed by the 
predicate.6° For example, my assent to the impulsive impression "it befits me to 
ambulare) and "it befits me to sit" (oportet me sedere). 
58 Stob. 2.88,1-7 = LS 331 = IG 102.9b. Here, I follow the standard interpretation 
exemplified by Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 56-66 (cf. LS 
2.200; Brennan, The Stoic Life, 87-88). 
59 I think that this follows from Stob. 2.97,15-98,6 (= LS 33J = IG 102.11[). There, 
we are told that advantages (iiphelemata) are "to be chosen" (hairetea), and that 
they are predicates corresponding to good things. Hairetea, or things that are "to 
be chosen': are directed at predicates, just as impulses are. From Stob. 2.86,2-3, 
it is clear that the Stoics thought that ophelemata are one species of the genus 
of kathekonta. If we assume that this means that hairetea are directed at the 
same predicates as impulses, it follows that impulse is directed at the predicate 
describing the kathekon. In other words, while prudence (phronesis) is a good 
thing, the predicate "being prudent" (phronein) is a kathekon, and in an impulsive 
impression involving this kathekon, impulse would be directed toward the agent's 
possession of prudence, i.e. achieving the state in which the predicate "being 
prudent" can be truthfully applied to him. I see no reason to assume that the Stoics 
thought that the same does not also hold for kathekonta that are not ophelemata, 
for example for the so-called intermediate proper functions (mesa kathekonta), 
such as "walking" (peripatein, cf. Stob. 2.97,4-5 = LS 59M4) or "getting married" 
(gamein, cf. Stob. 2.86,3), and thus for the whole genus of kathekonta. 
60 For arguments that the phrase "directed at" (horme!horman epi + ace.) in this 
context applies here to both the corporeal action and the incorporeal predicate 
describing the action, see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stocism, 
272, n. 53. 
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walk" initiates impulse towards the predicate "to walk'', and the corresponding 
action, walking, and results in my having the property of walking. But, then 
it seems to follow that befitting actions mentioned in impulsive impressions 
cannot be huparchonta. Namely, according to Chrysippus, 
only those predicates that are attributes are said to belong, 
for instance, "to walk'' belongs to me when I am walking, but 
it does not belong to me when I am lying down or sitting.6 '  
In other words, some predicate "belongs" to me (huparchei moi), i.e. refers to 
something existent, only when it  is my actual attribute (sumbebekos), i .e .  when 
it is indeed a property of my body. Because of this, the predicate "to walk'' 
(peripatein) belongs to me only when I am actually walking, that is, when "I 
am walking (peripatO)" corresponds to the reality. During the time when I 
am not walking, the predicate "to walk'' is not something that huparchei moi, 
i.e. something that belongs to me. Accordingly, the predicate "to walk'' in the 
impulsive impression "it befits me to walk (kathekei moi peripatein)" cannot 
huparchei moi unless walking is one of my attributes, that is, unless I am actually 
walking. However, according to the Stoic theory of impulse, my walking is 
initiated only at the moment I assent to the impulsive impression "it befits me 
to walk': which is when walking becomes my attribute and thus something that 
huparchei moi. But, at the time I am entertaining the impression and before I 
assent to it, walking is not one of my attributes and, therefore, not something 
huparchon for me. Because of this, it seems that no impulsive impression "it 
befits me to K' can be caused by something huparchon, since the action K is 
the effect of my assent to the impulsive impression, i .e. because K becomes 
something huparchon only after I assent to the impulsive impression .62 But, if 
6 1  Stob. 1 . 1 06,20-23 = LS 5 1 B4: kategori!mata huparchein legetai mona ta 
sumbebekota, hoion to peripatein huparchei moi hate peripatO, hote de katakeklimai 
e kathemai ouch huparchei. Notice that I have followed Long & Sedley in 
translating huparchein here as "belongs" because using the translation "exists'; 
which I have used in section I above, would sound very awkward in English; cf. 
n. 6 above. 
62 This problem remains even if huparchein here is understood in the sense that 
applies to incorporeal propositions or facts, in which it means "to be true" or "to 
be the case" (for this sense of huparchein, see Long, "Language and Thought in 
Stoicism'; 91 ). Before my impulse to walk occurs, it is not yet true or the case that 
I am walking; "I am walking" becomes the case only after I assent to the impulsive 
impression "it befits me to walk': That is why the solution proposed by Brennan 
(The Stoic Life, 78-79) to the problem of apprehensive impressions caused by other 
impressions does not apply to the impulsive impressions. Even if we grant that 
some apprehensive impressions could be caused by incorporeal sayables that are 
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impulsive impressions cannot be caused by huparchonta, then it seems that, as 
we have seen in section I, they cannot meet the Causal Requirement and that 
they cannot be apprehensive. 
One obvious problem of this result is that the claim that impulsive 
impressions cannot be apprehensive seems to imply that the practical perfection 
of the Sage is based on nonapprehensive impressions, or in other words, that 
there is nothing to distinguish morally perfect actions of the Sage from morally 
imperfect actions of the non -Sage. But this conclusion need not follow. Namely, 
we han seen at the end of section III above that the Stoics thought that it is 
possible to construct universalized impressions, which cannot be apprehensive, 
from sets of impressions about particulars, which can be apprehensive. 
Accordingly, from a set of impressions that evaluate someone's walking in 
a particular practical context, for example "Dion's walking is befitting in the 
practical context C", "Theon's walking is befitting in c: etc. ,  the agent could 
form a universalized impression "walking is befitting in C" or "it befits to walk in 
C'',"' and then, when in circumstances sufficiently similar to C, the agent could 
deduce the impulsive impression "it befits me to walk now". Examples of such 
universalized impressions about kathekonta are abundant in our sources; in 
fact, various lists of befitting actions that we find in preserved accounts of Stoic 
ethics seem to consist precisely of such universalized propositions. For example, 
Diogenes Laertius says that (in most contexts) honoring parents, brother, and 
the fatherland is befitting, that spending time with friends is befitting, while 
neglecting parents is not befitting, and so on (DL 7.108-109 = LS 59E.). Thus, 
even if impulsive impressions cannot be apprehensive, they can be deduced 
from the agent's knowledge of universal facts about which actions are befitting, 
which was in turn based on the apprehension of particular befitting actions of 
other agents. Obviously, if the agent is a non-Sage, at least some of his impulsive 
impressions would be deduced from false universal moral impressions, i.e. 
those that are based on nonapprehensive moral impressions about particulars. 
Therefore, it does not follow that, if impulsive impressions are incapable of 
being apprehensive, there would be nothing to distinguish between the morally 
huparchonta in the sense of "being true" or "being the case" (which is, as noted 
in Striker, "KptT�ptov T�� 6.Af]ll£ia�", 73-76, by no means uncontroversial), an 
impulsive impression of the form kathi!kei moi K by definition cannot be caused by 
such huparchonta, because K in the impulsive impression is not true (or the case) 
before the agent assents to the impulsive impression. 
63 I take it that the Stoics thought that impressions such as "walking is befitting" and 
"it befits to walk" are interchangeable, i.e. that they differ only in syntax; in the 
former, the evaluative element "is befitting" is expressed as a participle (kathekon) 
and the action as the corresponding noun (peripatesis), while in the latter the 
action is expressed in the form of infinitive (peripatein) and the evaluative element 
"it befits" in its verbal form (kathi!kei). 
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perfect actions of the Sage and the morally imperfect actions of the non-Sage. 
On the contrary, they would be distinguished by the fact that the former's actions 
would be based on knowledge about moral objects, i.e. on a set of assents to 
apprehensive moral/evaluative impressions about moral particulars, while the 
latter's actions would be based on a set of impressions which would contain 
at least some nonapprehensive moral/evaluative impressions about particulars. 
V I .  
In sections II  and III above, I have argued that Epictetus thought that 
certain moral impressions are capable of being apprehensive, and that these 
impressions, as perceptual impressions about particular corporeal objects, 
would have been capable of meeting the Causal Requirement described in 
section I. In section IV, we have suggested that the Stoics thought that moral 
impressions are both descriptions and evaluations, and in section V that 
there are no obstacles in assuming that certain evaluative impressions that are 
relevant for action can also be apprehensive, although impulsive impressions 
themselves cannot be apprehensive. What remains to be discussed, however, is 
whether there are moral/evaluative impressions that could meet the other two 
requirements necessary for apprehension. 
Let us start with the Accordance Requirement. In the case of the 
nonmoral impression, this requirement is met if and only if the predicates 
contained in the impression correspond to the properties that indeed belong 
to the impressor. By analogy, it is natural to assume that in the case of the 
moral/evaluative impression the Accordance Requirement is met if and only if 
moral predicates contained in the impression correspond to moral corporeal 
properties of the impressor. 
It seems, however, that the picture is more complicated than this. As 
we have seen in section IV above, moral impressions are descriptions not only 
of their impressors, but also of their evaluations. The meanings of evaluative 
predicates indicate a certain type of pursuit or evasion stance, and this must 
be taken into account when considering how moral impressions meet the 
Accordance Requirement. One way of doing this would be to assume that 
just as a nonmoral impression is in accordance with its impressor when the 
nonmoral predicates contained in it correspond to the nonmoral properties of 
the impressor, a moral/evaluative impression is in accordance with its impressor 
when the moral/evaluative predicates contained in it also indicate a correct stance 
towards the impressor. Because of their evaluative role, it seems that the chief 
criterion of success for a moral/evaluative impression should not be its being 
true as in the case of purely descriptive impressions, but primarily its correctness 
as an evaluation. Therefore, in order to meet the Accordance Requirement, it is 
crucial that the moral/evaluative impression is above all a correct evaluation of 
its object, which means that it associates the correct agent's stance to its object. 
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How is this association of correct stances to objects supposed to work? 
In order to see this, we have to understand how the Stoics classified evaluable 
objects and possible evaluative stances the agent can take towards them. On 
the one hand, they distinguished between four types of evaluable impressors 
classified in two general categories. In the first category they placed two 
general classes of things that are morally relevant, which they called goods 
(agatha) and bads (kaka), and in the second two general classes of things that 
are morally indifferent but practically relevant, which they called preferred 
indifferents (proegmena adiaphora) and dispreferred indifferents (apoproegmena 
adiaphora).64 Unlike good and bad things, morally indifferent things are 
those that in themselves neither benefit nor harm because they can be used 
both well and badly, depending on the context.65 Those indifferents that are 
in accordance with our nature/6 like health, pleasure, wealth, etc. have value 
(axia) and are thus preferred, while those that are not in accordance with 
our nature, like illness, pain, poverty, etc. have disvalue (apaxia) and are 
thus dispreferred.67 In virtue of having value or disvalue, indifferents too 
are capable of stimulating action. 
On the other hand, the Stoics thought that each of these four types 
of objects has a stance that is appropriately associated with it. We have already 
mentioned these four stances in section IV above: goods are worth choosing, 
bads are worth avoiding, preferred indifferents are worth taking, and dispreferred 
indifferents are worth not taking. Evaluating objects by associating correct 
stances to them was important for the Stoics because they thought that different 
stances involve different kinds of impulse. Although goods and preferred 
64 The distinction between good and bad things on the one hand and preferred and 
dispreferred indifferents on the other originated with Zeno (see Stob. 2.S7, 1 8-20 
= IG 1 02.Sa and 2.84, 1 8-24 = LS S8E l -2 = IG 1 02.7g). Despite dissenting views 
from some of the members, such as Aristo (see e.g. SE M 1 1 .64-67 = LS SSP and 
commentary on LS 1 .3S8-3S9), it remained the orthodox doctrine of the Stoic 
school. Nevertheless, Aristo's arguments could have been the motivation for 
Chrysippus to acknowledge the usage of agathon and kakon in the loose sense of 
these words; see below. 
6S DL 7. 1 03 = LS S8AS-6. For example, a preferred indifferent like wealth can be 
used in a vicious way; also, it is sometimes virtuous to give up your own life (a 
preferred indifferent) for your country or friends, or if suffering from an incurable 
disease (DL 7. 1 30 = LS 66H). 
66 See Stob. 2.79, 1 8-80, 1 3  = LS S8C 1 -3 = IG ! 02.7a; cf. DL 7. 102- 1 03 = LS S8A4 for 
a list of indifferents. 
67 Stob. 2.83, 10- 1 1  = LS S8D 1 = IG 1 02.7f. The difference in terms of value between 
goods and bads on the one hand and indifferents on the other is that goods and 
bads have absolute value and disvalue, while indifferents have relative value and 
disvalue (Stob., 2.84, 1 8-8S, 1 1 = LS SSE = IG 1 02.7g). 
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indifferents both stimulate the same general pursuit-type behavior, they thought 
that preferred indifferents are pursued conditionally because they stimulate 
conditional impulse towards them,6" while goods are pursued unconditionally 
because they stimulate unconditional impulse towards them. Analogously, 
bads stimulate unconditional impulse away from them, while dispreferred 
indifferents stimulate conditional impulse away from them. Therefore, it could 
be said that a moral/evaluative impression meets the Accordance Requirement 
if and only if it associates choosing with a good object, avoiding with a bad 
object, taking with an object that is a preferred indifferent, or not taking with 
an object that is a dispreferred indifferent, and eo ipso correctly stimulates an 
unconditional impulse towards a good object, an unconditional impulse away 
from a bad object, a conditional impulse towards a preferred indifferent, or a 
conditional impulse away from a dispreferred indifferent. 
If this is correct, however, then it follows that meeting the Causal and 
the Accordance Requirements is sufficient to make a moral/evaluative impression 
apprehensive. Namely, we have seen in section I above that the hallmark of the 
apprehensive impression is that it is not merely actually true, but such that it 
could not turn out false, and that meeting the Discrimination Requirement 
is supposed to secure this. In the case of nonmoral descriptive apprehensive 
impressions, the Discrimination Requirement is met by the apprehensive 
impression's ability to capture the ontological uniqueness of its object, which 
prevents the possibility of mistaking that object for another extremely similar 
but distinct object. In the case of moral/evaluative impressions, however, 
conditions for securing that an impression could not turn out incorrect seem 
to be different. In fact, they seem to be already sufficiently satisfied by meeting 
the strong version of the Accordance Requirement that we have described in the 
previous paragraph. A moral/evaluative impression that correctly associates the 
appropriate stance to the object is arguably already not only a correct evaluation, 
but also an evaluation that could not turn out incorrect. For example, the 
impression "Dion's prudence is a good thing" is not only a correct evaluation of 
Dion's prudence insofar as it indicates that prudence is worth choosing for Dion, 
but also an evaluation that could not turn out incorrect because, according 
to the Stoics, as a good object prudence is always worth choosing since it is a 
proper object of unconditional impulse. 
Did Epictetus and his Stoic predecessors think that meeting the 
Causal and the Accordance Requirements is sufficient to make a moral! 
evaluative impression apprehensive? It is quite possible. Such a view would be 
consistent with the view that the Stoics originally thought that an impression 
that meets the first two requirements-i.e. an impression that is caused by 
something existent and is in accordance with that existent thing-is already 
apprehensive. On this view, the Stoics added the Discrimination Requirement 
68 Cf. Stob. 2 .75, 1 - 3  = IG 1 02 .5o. 
18 6 EPICTETUS: HIS CONTINUING INFLUENCE AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE 
to the definition of the apprehensive impression only as a further explication of 
the Accordance Requirement in response to the pressure from the Academics 
to eliminate the possibility of confusing two extremely similar but distinct 
objects.69 Therefore, it is possible that the Stoics thought that the addition of the 
Discrimination Requirement was necessary only in the case of purely descriptive 
apprehensive impressions because only they were susceptible to the Academics' 
counterexamples requiring discrimination between extremely similar objects. 
On the other hand, I think that there is some reason to reject the 
assumption that meeting the Causal and the Accordance Requirements is 
sufficient to make a moral/evaluative impression apprehensive. Namely, Plutarch 
reports that Chrysippus wrote the following in his book On good things: 
If someone in accordance with such differences [ i.e. between 
the preferred and dispreferred] wishes to call the one class 
of them good and the other bad, and he is referring to 
these things [i .e. the preferred or the dispreferred] and not 
committing an idle aberration, his usage must be accepted 
on the grounds that he is not wrong on the matter of 
meanings [semainomenois) and in other respects is aiming at 
the normal use of terms.7" 
The text here suggests that Chrysippus thought that those who apply the 
concept "good" to preferred indifferents and the concept "bad" to dispreferred 
indifferents are not completely mistaken, and that their language usage does 
not involve a mistake in "the matter of meanings". However, we saw above that 
the Stoics distinguished sharply between things that are genuinely good and 
bad and things that are only preferred and dispreferred indifferents, as well as 
between stances that should be appropriately associated with them. So, what 
could Chrysippus have meant by saying that calling preferred indifferents good 
and dispreferred indifferents bad is not an error but something consistent with 
the meanings of these respective pairs of terms? It seems that Chrysippus is 
referring here to a potential agent's stances, which, as we have argued in section 
IV above, constitute parts of the meaning of moral/evaluative predicates. 
69 See, for example, Frede, "Stoic Epistemology': 302-311. The chief textual evidence 
that suggests this interpretation is Cic. Acad. 2. 77 = LS 4004-7. 
70 St. rep. 1 048A, trans!. by LS, 58H. Although the text has been the subject of many 
proposals for editorial emendations (cf. Cherniss, Plutarch: Moralia XIII: II, 530, 
ns. 1 0-18), it is reasonably clear that Chrysippus here states that, although this 
is not strictly speaking correct according to the Stoic doctrine, those who apply 
"good" (agathon) and "bad" (kakon) to preferred and dispreferred indifferents 
do not err in respect to the meanings of these moral concepts and are in general 
following the loose, everyday linguistic sense of these terms. 
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Indeed, there is a connection between goods and preferred inditferents, as well 
as between bads and dispreferred inditferents in respect to stances: goods and 
preferred inditferents are properly associated with a general pursuit-type of 
behavior (choosing and taking), while bads and dispreferred indifferents are 
associated with a general evasion-type behavior (avoiding and not taking). After 
all, this connection is not surprising given the fact that the Stoics thought that 
our conception of the good develops through analogy from our conception of 
the valuable, i .e. from our conception of the preferred inditferents.7 '  Because 
of this, it is possible that Chrysippus was trying to say that those who evaluate 
preferred inditferents as good and dispreferred inditferents as bad will not be 
completely wrong in respect to what kind of general behavior they associate 
with evaluated objects.72 For example, someone who assents to the impression 
"My health is something good" would be evaluating his own health as something 
that should be pursued, and this evaluation would be correct in most cases 
because even the Stoics thought that, although not a genuine good, health is an 
indifferent that is preferred, i.e. something that is generally in accordance with 
our nature and, as such, has a significant amount of (non-absolute) value.73 
If our interpretation of what Chrysippus had in mind above is correct, 
then (at least some of) the Stoics would have been inclined to understand the 
Accordance Requirement as a considerably weaker condition than the one we 
discussed a couple of paragraphs above. Instead of ensuring that each of the four 
71 Cic. Fin. 3.20- 2 1  = LS 59D2-4; 3.33 = LS 60D 1 -2; cf. jackson-McCabe, "The Stoic 
Theory of Implanted Preconceptions': 334-339.  
72 It remains unclear what Chrysippus's position would be on the truth-value of 
moral impressions that evaluate a preferred indifferent as something good or a 
dispreferred indifferent as something bad. Namely, if moral impressions have 
dual descriptive-evaluative function, then it seems that as descriptions, such 
impressions would be false. There is, perhaps, one way to avoid this conclusion. 
Arguably, moral concepts of an agent entertaining such impressions have not 
yet reached the level of development where they can track the Stoic distinction 
between genuine goods and bads, and preferred and dispreferred indifferents. 
Accordingly, when such an agent entertains an impression that some preferred 
indifferent impressor is good, perhaps his conception of good does correctly 
capture a corporeal element in the impressor that is in fact shared both by objects 
that are preferred indifferents and objects that are genuinely good. If so, then it 
seems that this agent's impression would be a true description after all. In any case. 
one could still say that, at least in most cases, such impressions are "in accordance 
with the impressor" in a substantial sense of this phrase. 
73 The same account could be given for evaluating dispreferred indifferents as 
something bad: "My illness is something bad" would be evaluating my illness as 
something that I should generally try to evade, which would in most cases be a 
correct evaluation. 
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types of evaluable objects (goods, bads, preferred and dispreferred indifferents) 
is associated with exactly one of the possible agent's stances (choosing, avoiding, 
taking and not taking) , this weaker version of the Accordance Requirement 
would be satisfied by simply assigning the correct kind of general behavior 
(pursuit or evasion) to objects belonging to one of the two general groups of 
evaluable impressors (goods and preferred indifferents, or bads and dispreferred 
indifferents ). It should immediately be clear that meeting this weaker Accordance 
Requirement would not be sufficient to make a moral/evaluative impression 
apprehensive. Although the agent assenting to impressions that meet only the 
Causal and the weak version of the Accordance Requirements would have 
evaluations that are in most situations, and perhaps even in all actual situations, 
correct, his evaluations would not be such that they could not turn out incorrect. 
There would still be (actual or possible) situations in which such an agent's 
evaluations could turn out incorrect. For example, someone who assents to the 
impression "My health is something good" and is hence evaluating his health is 
an object of general pursuit-type behavior, in most cases may be actually correct 
in his evaluation of health because in most cases health should properly be 
pursued. In fact, if he never actually encounters a situation in which it would 
be befitting for him to harm himself/4 this agent may even spend his whole life 
pursuing health and remain correct in his original evaluation .75 Nevertheless, 
his original evaluation of health would not be such that it could not turn out 
incorrect, because had the agent been in a situation in which it would have been 
befitting for him to give up his health, he would not have done it. His impression 
7 4 One example of such a situation is that, when the Sage is called to serve the 
interests of a tyrant, he would rather choose sickness than health in order to 
avoid the service, SE M 1 1 .66 = LS 58F4. From another place talking about the 
Sage's suicide (Stob. 2 . 1 1 0, 9- 1 0  = !G 1 02 . 1 1 m) ,  it is clear that in such situations 
actions that are contrary to what is normally a preferred indifferent are considered 
befitting (kathekon) by the Sage. 
75 Indeed, it seems that the "moral progressor" (prokopt6n), a non-Sage who has 
progressed to the furthest point short of becoming the Sage, mentioned by 
Chrysippus in Stob. 5.906, 1 8-907,5 ( = LS 591) is precisely such an agent-a 
person whose all moral/evaluative impressions he has assented to so far have 
actually turned out correct, but at least some of these impressions are nevertheless 
nonapprehensive. As Chrysippus says, even though all of this person's actual 
actions are based on correct evaluations (because they are all befitting), he has 
not yet achieved happiness and wisdom because his actions have not yet acquired 
firmness and fixity that characterizes the actions of the Sage. I take this to mean 
that regardless of the fact that this person actually acts correctly, at least some 
of his actions are based on moral impressions that could turn out to be incorrect 
evaluations. That is why his actions have not yet achieved the firmness and fixity 
of the Sage's actions. 
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"My health is something good" would evaluate his health as something worth 
choosing, and since choosing is a stance that involves unconditional impulse, 
it would have prevented him from giving up his health in this situation.76 In 
other words, a moral/evaluative impression that meets the Causal and the Weak 
Accordance Requirements would not enable the agent to discriminate between 
actual situations in which his evaluation is correct and counterfactual situations 
in which his evaluation would have been incorrect, and the ability to make 
such discriminations is, as we have seen, crucial for making a moral/evaluative 
impression apprehensive.77 
Therefore, in order to be apprehensive, a moral/evaluative impression 
would have to meet an additional requirement, which would be parallel to the 
third requirement from section I above. The role of this additional requirement 
that would serve as the Discrimination Requirement for the moral/evaluative 
apprehensive impression would be to ensure that the agent's evaluation of the 
object is not only correct, but such that it could not turn out incorrect. From 
our discussion so far, it should be clear that the Discrimination Requirement 
would be met through correct association of stances that involve conditional 
and unconditional impulses to corresponding evaluable objects. More 
precisely, a moral/evaluative impression that meets this requirement would 
be the impression that correctly associates stances involving unconditional 
impulse with genuine good and bad objects, and stances involving conditional 
impulse to preferred and dispreferred indifferents. Defined in this way, the 
Discrimination Requirement in conjunction with the weak version of the 
Accordance Requirement described above now seems to be able to ensure 
that the impression meeting it is an evaluation that is not only correct, but 
such that it could not turn out incorrect. The way in which the Accordance 
76 In explaining the difference between the moral disposition of the Sage and the 
non-Sage, the preserved texts suggest that the Stoics invested more effort in 
focusing on the cases of mistaking preferred indifferents for genuine goods 
than on, for example, mistaking genuine goods for preferred indifferents (see, 
for example, DL 7. 10 1- 103 = LS 58A; SE M 1 1 .200-201 = LS 59G). This is to 
be expected, because most ordinary people as well as non-Stoic philosophers 
consider moral indifferents to be geniune goods or bads. After all, even the Stoics 
themselves believed, as we have seen above, that the conception of relative value of 
things that they classified as preferred indifferents is developmentally prior to the 
conception of the genuine good. I do not think, however, that this means that their 
approach to analyzing evaluations that mistake genuine goods and bads for objects 
of conditional impulse would have been any different. 
77 Here I agree with Brennan (The Stoic Life, 1 78) and his emphasis on the 
importance of the correctness of evaluations in not only actual, but counterfactual 
situations as well for the moral and practical perfection of the Sage and his 
distinction from the non-Sage. 
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and the Discrimination Requirements work together to make a moral! 









We are now finally ready to attempt to formulate a definition of 
the moral/evaluative apprehensive impression; it would state that a moral/ 
evaluative impression is apprehensive if and only if it meets the following three 
requirements: 
(1) The Causal Requirement: the impression must be 
caused by an impressor that is existent; 
(2) The Accordance Requirement: the impression has 
to be in accordance with the impressor that caused it; 
this means that the moral/evaluative predicates 
contained in the impression must evaluate the 
impressor by correctly associating a general 
pursuit-type (choosing or taking) or a general 
evasion-type (avoidance or not taking) stance with 
the impressor; 
(3) The Discrimination Requirement: the impression 
must be such that it enables the agent to discriminate 
between actual situations in which the impression 
is a correct evaluation of the impressor and possible 
counterfactual situations in which the impression 
would be an incorrect evaluation of the impressor; 
this means that the moral/evaluative predicates 
contained in the impression must correctly associate 
unconditional or conditional impulse with the 
impressor (unconditional to goods and bads, 
conditional to preferred and dispreferred 
indifferents ) .  
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As we can see from the definition, the mechanisms enabling nonmoral 
and moral impressions to meet the Discrimination Requirement, although 
different, nevertheless both rely on some kind of special discriminatory power 
that characterizes the apprehensive impressions. In the case of the non-moral 
apprehensive impression, this mechanism, as we have seen in section I above, 
relies on the ability of the impression to discriminate between extremely similar 
but distinct impressors because confusing such objects is the chief obstacle to 
achieving nonmoral apprehension. In the case of moral/evaluative apprehensive 
impressions, this mechanism relies on the ability of the impression to 
discriminate between genuine goods and preferred indifferents, or genuine bads 
and dispreferred indifferents because confusing these impressors is the chief 
obstacle to achieving moral apprehension. However, in both cases, the person 
who assents only to true impressions that distinguish between extremely similar 
but distinct objects and correct evaluations that distinguish between genuinely 
morally relevant objects and indifferents will be capable of achieving epistemic, 
moral, and practical perfection worthy of a Stoic Sage.7" 
78 Of course, just as in the case of descriptive apprehensive impressions and 
knowledge, entertaining apprehensive moral/evaluative impressions is only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving moral and practical perfection. 
In addition, the agent needs to achieve the state in which he assents only to moral! 
evaluative impressions that are apprehensive, and never to moral/evaluative 
impressions that are nonapprehensive. 
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